Incommensurability (and Related Matters) 

Bibliography on Incommensurability

 
 
 
 
 

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Achinstein, P. (1964). "On the Meaning of Scientific Terms." Journal of Philosophy 61: 497-509.

Agassi, J. (1994). "Minimal Criteria for Intellectual Progress." Iyyun  43: 61-83.

Agazzi, E. (1985). "Commensurability, Incommensurability, and Cumulativity in Scientific Knowledge."Erkenntnis 22: 51-77.

Agazzi, E. (1885). "The Historical Dimensions of Science and its Philosophy."Diogenes 132: 60-79. 

Agazzi, E. (1988). Die Objektivität in den verschiedenen Wissenschaften. Fribourg: Editions Universitaires.

Agazzi, E. (1990). Die Vergleichbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Theorien. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag.

Allchin, D. (1994). "The Super Bowl and The Ox Phos Controversy: "Winner Take All" Competition in Philosophy Of Science." Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1: 22-33.

Allchin, D. (1996). "Points East And West: Acupuncture And Comparative Philosophy Of Science."Proceedings Of The Biennial Meetings Of The Philosophy Of Science Association 3: 107-115.

Ambrus, V. (1999). "Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?" Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30: 1-16.

Andersen, H. (1996). "Categorization, Anomalies and the Discovery of Nuclear Fission."Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 27: 463-492.

Andersen, H., P. Barker and X. Chen. (1996). "Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psycho-logy."Philosophical Psychology 9: 347-363.

Andersson, G. (1988).Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Kuhns, Lakatos und Feyerabends Kritik des kritischen Rationalismus. Tübingen: Mohr.

Andersson, G. (1988). "Die Wissenschaft als objektive Erkenntnis." In E. Agazzi, ed., Die Objektivität in den verschiedenen Wissenschaften, pp. 27-39, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires. 

Aronson, J.L. (1989). "Testing for Convergent Realism." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 255-259.

Arregui, J. (1997). "Incommensurabilidad y relativismo: el reconocimiento de lo humano."Contrastes 2: 27-51.

Austin, W. (1972). "Paradigms, Rationality, and Partial Communication." Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3: 203-218.

Baigrie, B. (1988). "Commentary to Margolis's "In Defense of Relativism"." Social Epistemology 2: 228-232.

Bailey, A. (1997). "Split Level Contexts, Intersubjective Facts and Semi-Naive Empiricism: A Semi-Naive Fairy Story."Prima Philosophia 10: 457-471.

Balsiger, F. and A. Burri. (1990). "Sind die klassische Mechanik und die spezielle Relativitätstheorie kommensurabel?"Journal for General Philosophy of Science 21: 157-162.

Balzer, W. (1978). "Incommensurability and Reduction." Acta Philosophica Fennica 30: 313-335.

Balzer, W. (1985). "Was ist Inkommensurabilität?"Kant-Studien 76: 196-213.

Balzer, W. (1985). "Incommensurability, Reduction, and Translation." Erkenntnis 23: 255-267.

Balzer, W. (1989). "On Incommensurability." In K. Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis and P. Nicolacopoulos, eds., Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 

Balzer, W., C. Moulines and J. Sneed. (1987).An Architectonic for Science. TheStructuralist Program. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Barker, P., H. Andersen and X. Chen. (1996). "Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology." Philosophical Psychology 9: 347-363.

Barnes, B. and D. Bloor. (1982). "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge." In M. Hollis and S. Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism, Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 

Barnhart, M. (1994). "'Sunyata', Textualism, and Incommensurability." Philosophy East and West 44: 647-658.

Barrotta, P. (1988). "Teoria della Argomentazione e Filosofia della la Scienza."Epistemologia 11: 255-276.

Barrotta, P. (1998). "Contemporary Philosophy of Science in Italy: An Overview." Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29: 327-345.

Bartels, A. (1990). "Review of P. Hoyningen-Huene: Die Wissenschaftsphilosophie Thomas S. Kuhns."Conceptus 24: 104-109.

Bartels, A. (1995). "Chains of Meaning: A Model For Concept Formation in Contemporary Physics Theories."Synthese 105: 347-379.

Batens, D. (1983). "The Relevance of Theory-Ladenness and Incommensurability, and a Survey of the Contributions to this Issue."Philosophica 31: 3-6.

Batens, D. (1983). "Incommensurability is not a Threat to the Rationality of Science or to the Anti-Dogmatic Tradition."Philosophica 32: 117-132.

Bayley, C. (1995). "Our World Views (May Be) Incommensurable: Now What?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20: 271-283.

Bellone, E. (1978). "Thomas Kuhn e Il Libro della Natura." Scientia 113: 675-682.

Bernstein, R. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Bernstein, R. (1991). "Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited." In E. Deutsch, ed.,Culture and Modernity. East-West Philosophic Perspectives, pp. 85-103, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 

Bhaskar, R. (1986). Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London NewYork: Verso.

Biagioli, M. (1990). "The Anthropology of Incommensurability." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21: 183-209.

Bishop, M. (1991). "Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating."Philosophical Studies 63: 343-356.

Bishop, M. and S. Stich. (1998). "The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science."Philosophy of Science 65. 

Bohm, D. (1974). "Science as Perception-Communication." In F. Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 374-391, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 

Bombardi, R. (1988). "Davidson in Flatland."Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66: 66-74.

Boniolo, G. (1992). "Theory and Experiment: The Case of Eotvos' Experiments." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 459-486.

Boros, J. (1990). "Probleme der Inkommensurabilität." In E. Agazzi, ed., Die Vergleichbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Theorien, pp. 125-132, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires.

Boyd, R. (1979). "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?" In A. Ortony, ed.,Metaphor and Thought, pp. 356-408, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boyd, R. (1984). "The Current Status of Scientific Realism." In J. Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism, pp. 41-82, Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Boyd, R. (1992). "Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method." In J. Earman, ed.,Inference, Explanation, and other Frustrations. Essays in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 131-198, Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Broccard, N. (1982). "Going on with Systematology."Metaphilosophy 13: 263-276.

Bromberger, S. (1990). "L'Incommensurabilité en Science et La Possibilité d'Argumenter." In M. Meyer and A. Lempereur, eds., Figures at Conflits Rhetoriques, pp. 241-253, Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles. 

Brown, H. (1977). Perception, Theory and Commitment. The New Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brown, H. (1983). "Incommensurability."Inquiry 26: 3-29.

Brown, H. (1983). "Response to Siegel."Synthese 56: 91-103.

Brown, H. (1990). "Prospective Realism."Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21: 211-242.

Burian, R. (1984). "Scientific Realism and Incommensurability: Some Criticisms of Kuhn and Feyerabend." In R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky, eds., Methodology, Metaphysics and the History of Science; in Memory of Benjamin Nelson, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 1-31, Dordrecht: Reidel. 

Buzzoni, M. (1998). "Scienza, tecnica e conoscenza comune in Bachelard." Epistemologia 21: 343-354.

Carey, S. (1988). "Conceptual differences between children and adults." Mind & Language 3: 167-181.

Carey, S. (1991). "Knowledge acquisition: Enrichment or conceptual change?" In S. Carey and R. Gelman, eds.,The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition, pp. 257-291, Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 

Carey, S. and R. Gelman. (1991). The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

Carnap, R. (1966). Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York: Basic Books.

Causey, R. (1974). "Professor Bohm's View of the Structure and Development of Theories." In F. Suppe, ed.,The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 392-401, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 

Chalmers, A. (1999) What is this Thing called Science? 3rd edition. Hackett Pub. Co.: Indianapolis. 

Chen, X. (1990). "Local Incommensurability and Communicability." In A. Fine, M. Forbes and L. Wessels, eds.,PSA 1990: Proceedings of the 1990 Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 67-76, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. 

Chen, X. (1994). "How Do Scientists Have Disagreements about Experiments? Incommensurability in the Use of Goal-Derived Categories." Perspectives on Science 2: 275-301.

Chen, X. (1997). "Thomas Kuhn's Latest Notion of Incommensurability."Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28: 257-273.

Chen, X., H. Andersen and P. Barker. (1998). "Kuhn's Theory Of Scientific Revolutions And Cognitive Psychology." Philosophical Psychology 11: 5-28.

Churchill, J. (1989). "'If a Lion Could Talk'." Philosophical Investigations 12: 308-324.

Churchill, J. (1990). "The Bellman's Map: Does Antifoundationalism Entail Incommensurability and Relativism?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 28: 469-484.

Cohen, J. (1999). "Deliberation, Tradition, and the Problem of Incommensurability: Philosophical Reflections on Curriculum Decision Making." Educational Theory49: 71-89.

Colapietro, V. (1996). "Marking Distinctions and Making Differences: Being "As" Dialectic." Journal Of Speculative Philosophy 10: 1-18.

Collier, J. (1984). "Pragmatic Incommensurability." In P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, eds., PSA 1984. Proceedings of the 1984 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 146-153, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. 

Collins, H. and T. Pinch. (1982). Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science. Boston: Routledge.

Corry, L. (1993). "Kuhnian Issues, Scientific Revolutions and the History of Mathematics."Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24: 95-117.

Cortois, P. (1995). "Farewell to a Brilliant Dish Cleaner: Paul Feyerabend and the Merry Philosophy of Science." Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57: 91-110.

Couvalis, G. (1989). Feyerabend's Critique of Foundationalism. Brookfield: Gower.

Crofts, A. (1979). "Peter Mitchell and the Chemiosmotic Hypothesis." Biochemical Society Bulletin 1: 4-7.

Crowder, G. (1998). "John Gray's Pluralist Critique of Liberalism." Journal of Applied Philosophy 15: 287-298.

Danneberg, L. (1989). Struktur, Aufbau und Evaluation. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Davidson, D. (1974). "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." Proceedings & Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 5-20.

Davidson, D. (1982). "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." In J. Meiland and M. Krausz, eds., Relativism. Cognitive and Moral. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 

Devitt, M. (1979). "Against Incommensurability."Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57: 29-50.

Devitt, M. (1984). Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Devitt, M. and K. Sterelny. (1987). Language and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

Diederich, W. (1989). "The Development Of Structuralism, A Re-Evaluation on the Occasion of W. Stegmuller's Theorie Und Erfahrung." Erkenntnis 30: 363-386.

Doppelt, G. (1978). "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense."Inquiry 21: 33-86. 

Doppelt, G. (1980). "A Reply to Siegel on Kuhnian Relativism." Inquiry 23: 117-123.

Doppelt, G. (1981). "Laudan's Pragmatic Alternative to Positivism and Historicism." Inquiry24: 253-271.

Doppelt, G. (1982). "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense." In J. Meiland and M. Krausz, eds., Relativism. Cognitive and Moral, pp. 113-146, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 

Doppelt, G. (1983). "Relativism and Recent Pragmatic Theories of Scientific Rationality." In N. Rescher, ed.,Scientific Explanation and Understanding: Essays on Reasoning in Science, pp. 106-142, Pittsburgh: University Press of America. 

Doppelt, G. (1988). "The Philosophical Requirements for an Adequate Conception of Scientific Rationality."Philosophy of Science 55: 104-133.

Doppelt, G. (1988). "Relativism and the Reticulational Model of Scientific Rationality."Synthese 69: 225-252.

Doppelt, G. (1990). "The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: A Critique."Philosophy of Science57: 1-19.

Drago, A. (1990). "The Four Scientific Models of Physical Reality." Epistemologia 13: 303-324.

Drago, A. (1999). "Incommensurability as a Bound of Hermeneutics in Science." In M. Fehér, O. Kiss and L. Ropolyi, eds., Hermeneutics and Science, pp. 135-155, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 

Edison, J. (1985). "Popperian and Kuhnian Theories of Truth and The Imputation of Relativism." Indian Philosophical Quarterly 12: 9-22.

Eisenhardt, P. (1984). Theorienvergleich über P. K. Feyerabend. Frankfurt: Pan Text Verlag. (also: Frankfurt, Univ.; Fachbereich Philosophie, Dissertation 1982)

Enç, B. (1976). "Reference of Theoretical Terms." Nous 10: 261-282.

English, J. (1978). "Partial Interpretation and Meaning Change." Journal of Philosophy 75: 57-76.

Estany, A. and D. Quesada. (1997). Actas del II Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Barcelona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma Barcelona.

Falkenburg, B. (1997). "Incommensurability and Measurement." Theoria 12: 467-491.

Fernández-Moreno, L. (1995). "La noción de inconmensurabilidad en Kuhn." In ed., L. Lull, pp. 441-456. 

Fernández-Moreno, L. (1997). "La inconmensurabilidad de teorías: Kuhn versus Putnam." In A. Estany and D. Quesada, eds., Actas del II Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, pp. 177-180, Barcelona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma Barcelona. 

Fernández-Moreno, L. (1997). "Inconmensurabilidad y relativismo ontológico." In A. Estany and D. Quesada, eds.,Actas del II Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, pp. 181-184, Barcelona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma Barcelona. 

Fernández-Moreno, L. (1997). "Es la referencia del término "agua" inmutable?" Theoria 12: 493-509.

Fernández Moreno, L. (1998). "Incommensurability, Reference and Truth." In C. Martínez,et. al., eds., Truth in Perspective, pp. 399-417, Aldershot: Ashgate. 

Fernández-Moreno, L. (1998). "Es la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad incoherente?" In C. Solís, ed.,Alta tensión, pp. 279-291, Barcelona: Paidós. 

Feyerabend, P. (1962). "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism." In H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, pp. 28-97, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 

Feyerabend, P. (1965). "On the "Meaning" of Scientific Terms." Journal of Philosophy 12: 266-274.

Feyerabend, P. (1965). "Reply to Criticism: Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam." In R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky, eds.,Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1962-64: In Honor of Philipp Frank. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, pp. 223-261,New York:Humanities Press.

Feyerabend, P. (1970). "Consolations for the Specialist." In I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, pp. 197-230, London: Cambridge University Press. 

Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left Books.

Feyerabend, P. (1976). Wider den Methodenzwang. Skizze einer anarchistischen Erkenntnistheorie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Feyerabend, P. (1977). "Changing Patterns of Reconstruction." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science28: 351-382.

Feyerabend, P. (1978). Science in a Free Society. London: New Left Books.

Feyerabend, P. (1979). Erkenntnis für freie Menschen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Feyerabend, P. (1981). Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Feyerabend, P. (1981). Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feyerabend, P. (1981). "More Clothes from the Emperor's Bargain Basement. A review of Laudan's Progress and its Problems."British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32: 57-71.

Feyerabend, P. (1987). "Putnam on Incommensurability."British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 75-81.

Feyerabend, P. (1988). Against Method. Revised edition. London: Verso.

Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against Method. 3rd edition. London: Verso.

Feyerabend, P. (1999). Conquest of Abundance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Field, H. (1973). "Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference." Journal of Philosophy 70: 462-481.

Fine, A. (1967). "Consistency, Derivability, and Scientific Change." Journal of Philosophy64: 231-240.

Fine, A. (1975). "How to Compare Theories: Reference and Change." Nous 9: 17-32.

Flonta, M. (1978). ""A "weak" and a "strong" Version of the Incommensurability Thesis."Philosophie et Logique 20: 395-406.

Flores, F. (1995). "Entre La Identidad y La Inconmensurabilidad, La Diferencia: Aristoteles y Freud: El Caso De La Analogia." Analogia Filosofica 9: 3-26.

Franklin, A. (1984). "Are Paradigms Incommensurable?"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35: 57-60.

Fu, D. (1995). "Higher Taxonomy and Higher Incommensurability." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26: 273-294.

Fuller, S. (1988). Social Epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Fuller, S. and M. De May. (1987). "An Interview with Marc De Mey on the Possibility of Cognitive Science as a Focal Point for Science Studies." Social Epistemology 1: 83-95.

Gaeta, R. (1990). "Significado, referencia e inconmensurabilidad." Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 16: 80-86.

Garrison, M. (1988). "Relativity, Complementarity, Indeterminacy, and Psychological Theory." Journal of Mind and Behavior9: 113-135.

Garver, E. (1987). "Paradigms and Princes."Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17: 21-47.

Geraets, T. (1979). Rationality To-Day. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.

Ghosh, T. (1998). "Berkeley's Idealism, Internal Realism and the Incommensurability Thesis." Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25: 241-251.

Giedymin, J. (1970). "The Paradox of Meaning Variance." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21: 257-268.

Giedymin, J. (1971). "Consolations for the Irrationalist?" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22: 39-48.

Gonzalez-Castan, O. (1999). "Reflexion historiografica y tradiciones filosoficas: un conflicto sin resolver."Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia 16: 35-56.

Gopnik, A. (1988). "Conceptual and Semantic Development as Theory Change: The Case of Object Permanence." Mind & Language 3: 197-216.

Grandy, R. (1983). "Incommensurability: Kinds and Causes." Philosophica 32: 7-24.

Greenwood, J. (1990). "Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The 'Theory-Informity' of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis." Philosophy of Science 57: 553-574.

Grover, S. (1998). "Incommensurability and the Best of All Possible Worlds." Monist 81: 648-668.

Guarino, T. (1990). "Revelation and Foundationalism: Towards Hermeneutical and Ontological Appropriateness." Modern Theology6: 221-235.

Gutting, G. (1980). Paradigms and Revolutions. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Haack, S. (1997). "The Puzzle of 'Scientific Method'." Revue Internationale de Philosophie51: 495-505.

Hacking, I. (1979). "Michel Foucault's Immature Science." Nous 13: 39-51.

Hacking, I. (1982). "Language, Truth and Reason." In M. Hollis and S. Lukes, eds.,Rationality and Relativism, pp. 48-66, Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 

Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hacking, I. (1988). "On the Stability of the Laboratory Sciences." Journal of Philosophy 85: 507-514.

Hacking, I. (1992). "The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences." In A. Pickering, ed.,Science as Practice and Culture, pp. 29-64, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Hacking, I. (1993). "Working in a New World: The Taxonomic Solution." In P. Horwich, ed., World Changes. Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, pp. 275-310, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press. 

Hales, S. (1997). "A Consistent Relativism."Mind 106: 33-52.

Harper, W. (1978). "Conceptual Change, Incommensurability and Special Relativity Kinematics." Acta Philosophica Fennica 30: 430-461.

Hatab, L. (1990). Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths. Peru: Open-Court.

Hattiangadi, J. (1971). "Alternatives and Incommensurables: the Case of Darwin and Kelvin." Philosophy of Science38: 502-507.

Hattiangadi, J. (1974). "The Importance of Auxiliary Hypotheses." Ratio16: 115-120.

Hattiangadi, J. (1976). "Rationality and the Problem of Scieitific Traditions." Dialectica.

Hattiangadi, J. (1977). "The Crisis in Methodology: Paul Feyerabend."Philosophy of the Social Sciences.

Hattiangadi, J. (1983). "A Methodology without Methodological Rules." In R. Cohen and M. Wartowsky, eds.,Language, Logic and Methodology, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht: Reidel. 

Hattiangadi, J. (1987). How Is Languatge Possible? An Essay in the Evolution of Expressive Capability in Language from a Biological Perspective. La Salle: Open Court.

Hautamõki, A. (1983). "Scientific Change and Intensional Logic." Philosophica 32: 25-42.

Heidelberger, M. (1976). "Some Intertheoretic Relations Between Ptolemean and Copernican Astronomy."Erkenntnis 10: 323-336.

Hempel, C. (1977). "Die Wissenschaftstheorie des analytischen Empirismus im Lichte zeitgenössischer Kritik." In G. Patzig, E. Scheibe, and W. Wieland, eds., Logik, Ethik, Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften, pp. 20-34, Hamburg: Meiner. 

Hempel, C. (1979). "Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs Pragmatic Perspectives." In T. Geraets, ed., Rationality To-Day, pp. 46-58, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 

Hentschel, K. (1990). Interpretationen und Fehlinterpretationen der speziellen und der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie durch Zeitgenossen Albert Einsteins. Basel: Birkhäuser.

Hentschel, K. (1990). "Inkommensurabilitätseffekte in der Debatte zwischen Oskar Kraus, Philipp Frank und Benno Urbach." In K. Hentschel, ed., Interpretationen und Fehlinterpretationen der speziellen und der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie durch Zeitgenossen Albert Einsteins, pp. 541-549, Basel: Birkhäuser. 

Hernández-Iglesias, M. (1994). "Incommensurability without Dogmas." Dialectica 48: 29-45.

Hidalgo, C. (1988). "Inconmensurabilidad y criterios de identidad de esquemas conceptuales." Analisis Filosofico8: 69-78.

Hintikka, J. (1988). "On the Incommensurability of Theories." Philosophy of Science 55: 25-38.

Hintikka, J. (1998). "Ramsey Sentences and the Meaning of Quantifiers." Philosophy of Science 65: 289-305.

Holcomb III, H. (1989). "Interpreting Kuhn: Paradigm Choice as Objective Value Judgment." Metaphilosophy20: 51-67.

Horsten, L. (1999). "The Layered Structure of Physics According to Peter Galison."Tijdschrift voor Filosofie61: 747-778.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1990). "Kuhn's Conception of Incommensurability." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science21: 481-492.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1990). "Inkommensurabilität bei Kuhn und Theorienvergleich." In E. Agazzi, ed., Die Vergleichbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Theorien, pp. 97-108, Freiburg: Universitätsverlag.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993). Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions. Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, trans. A. Levin, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1998). "On Thomas Kuhn's Philosophical Significance."Configurations 6: 1-14.

Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2000). "Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn." In J. Preston, G. Munevar and D. Lamb, eds., The Worst Enemy of Science? Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend, pp. 102-114, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Hoyningen-Huene, P., E. Oberheim and H. Andersen. (1996). "On Incommensurability."Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 27: 131-141.

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